1. What Iran offered, and why Washington said no
As of 4 November: Qatar tables a new proposal, Tehran calls the US answer unconvincing, and Trump sounds quieter after the election defeat. According to Reuters, Qatari mediators expect feedback from both sides on a new proposal within 36 hours (3 November, 08:11 ET); spokesman Majed Al Ansari said Doha is working towards an interim deal, and the foreign ministry said both sides remain committed to mediation (CBS News, Reuters). Tehran is holding back: Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, called the US response “not convincing” on 3 November; the strait will not reopen until Washington lifts the naval blockade, waives oil sanctions and observes a ceasefire that includes Lebanon (AP via PBS). A senior Iranian official told Reuters the two sides were “still far from a deal”. Chief negotiator Ghalibaf wrote on X on 4 November that Americans had said “NO TO WAR” and Iran endorsed that message; anyone who betrays the public will would learn that Iran’s no “comes with a Nightmare” (CBS News). In Washington, Democrats win the House and the Senate (Reuters, 4 November). Trump told Fox News “part of it was Iran”, told the Wall Street Journal he does not regret the war (“I did the right thing. I would have done it again”), and told the Financial Times the US is “locked and loaded” but there “may be no reason for it”, with no immediate plans to strike (CBS News, Bloomberg via Irish Times). Vice President Vance had said on 2 November that he and Trump “both feel pretty good” about a negotiated settlement (AP). Two regional officials described to AP the framework the mediators are working on: Iran stops attacks in the strait, the US lifts the blockade.
As of 22 October: Tehran says talks are continuing through mediators; Washington has not confirmed this. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told the Saudi broadcaster Al Ekhbariya on 21 October that talks with the US were continuing through mediators such as Pakistan and Qatar. Iran's seven-day plan provides for the strait to be fully reopened on the sixth day, he said, adding: “The Americans informed us that they agreed to these conditions, but they wanted to add a few more clauses” (Arab News Pakistan). That is Iran's version of events. President Masoud Pezeshkian told Pakistan's army chief Munir that Washington must lift pressure, threats and sanctions first. Sequencing remains the sticking point: the US wants the nuclear file addressed first, Iran wants pressure eased and the strait dealt with first.
As of 20 October: Iran says its seven-day proposal still stands, but no negotiations on it have been confirmed. Speaking at a meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in Baghdad on 18 October, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Iran's position rests on the proposal it sent to Washington and that the proposal is still on the table (Antiwar.com, citing Reuters). President Trump has threatened to “soon finish the job” with Iran; Araghchi's answer was “We have unfinished jobs too” (Al Jazeera). In a Newsmax interview on 15 October Trump ruled out nuclear weapons and ground troops and said the war would end “very soon”, by force or by diplomacy, after which oil prices would fall; his expectation of a deal after the 3 November midterms goes back to his speech at the UN General Assembly in September (Al Jazeera).
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Tehran on 19 October, his first trip there since February 2025; according to Al Jazeera, he linked restoring navigation through Hormuz to protection for Iran against renewed attacks. Tehran is not softening its line: First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref said on 19 October, according to IRNA, that Iran has “no choice” but to assert control over Hormuz to protect its security and that the US “must pay the price” (Bloomberg via The Irish Times). The earlier updates further down remain as a record.
As of 11 October: Washington has replied to Iran's conditions, and Tehran calls the reply insufficient. The answer came through Qatari mediators. Mohsen Rezaee, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, told state media on 11 October that the US had accepted some of Iran's conditions while others remained unclear and had to be clarified; Iran was not currently responding to the Americans, and the Strait of Hormuz would stay closed until the conditions were met (Reuters). Washington, for its part, wants a meaningful reduction in uranium enrichment (Vice President Vance, Al Jazeera). Al Jazeera does not expect a breakthrough before Israel's election on 27 October and the US midterm elections on 3 November. The sections below on the seven-day plan of 25 September stay on the page as background.
As of 9 October: the channel for talks exists, a deal is not in sight, and both sides are leaning on pressure. Parliament speaker Ghalibaf said on 4 October that the strait would stay closed until seven Iranian conditions were met; their wording has not been published (Arab News). President Pezeshkian called negotiations with Washington “futile” on 5 October: every time Iran comes to the negotiating table, he said, war is immediately imposed on it. Foreign Minister Araghchi had kept the door open on 4 October by saying that only talks built on justice and fairness could end the conflict (Al Jazeera, 7 October). On the US side Vice President JD Vance wants a “meaningful” reduction in Iran's enrichment capacity rather than mere assurances; experts see in it a possible sign that Washington is moving away from the earlier demand that Iran give up enrichment altogether. Secretary of State Rubio said Iran had lost control of the strait completely (Al Jazeera). On 8 October President Trump wrote that the US would not attack Iran “at any time prior to the Midterm Elections” on 3 November, that the talks were productive and that the blockade would remain “in full force and effect” (ABC News). Before that, reports that Washington had finalised plans for possible strikes ahead of the elections, without a final decision, had pushed oil higher (investingLive, 8 October).
The offer came in two steps. On 22 September a senior Iranian official told Reuters that Tehran could reopen the strait within seven days if the United States eased military pressure and lifted the blockade (Israel Hayom citing Reuters). On 25 September Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi presented the worked-out roadmap at the UN General Assembly: release of frozen Iranian funds, an end to oil sanctions and an end to the naval blockade, steps he said could be done in four to five days, with the strait reopened and final negotiations started on day seven (Al Jazeera). According to CBS News the package also covered a ceasefire across every front in the region, Lebanon included, with Qatar, Oman and UN officials in the middle.
President Trump rejected it on 26 September in front of reporters: “I'm rejecting their deal,” adding that Iran wanted an agreement only “because they are losing so badly” (CBS News). The United States, he said, controls the strait (Times of Israel). The Wall Street Journal has reported that Trump told aides he expects to resume bombing after the November midterm elections (cited by Times of Israel). Araghchi's reply on 27 September: Iran will not back down on its conditions, only a negotiated settlement can end the stand-off, and Tehran is waiting for the mediators to relay Washington's final position (Al Jazeera, CBS News).
As of 2 October: the reply is in, the deal is not, and the threats are growing sharper. Araghchi met the Qatari mediators in New York on 28 September and expected the formal US reply by Tuesday (Al Jazeera). Trump told Axios the same day: “They want to make a deal, but it is not the deal that I want to make”, and denied any concession: “I offered them NOTHING!”; a US official called the indirect talks “positive and constructive” but said there would be no deal unless the nuclear issues were addressed (CBS News). The reply arrived on 30 September via Qatar: according to Gulf News the two sides largely agree on the required steps but remain divided over their sequencing, in other words over who moves first. Iran's demands stand: an end to the naval blockade, sanctions waivers, release of about $12 billion in frozen assets and a regional ceasefire including Lebanon; Washington wants a comprehensive package that covers the nuclear programme (Al Jazeera). Araghchi: “We are fully prepared for the time for the war to be resumed” (Al Jazeera).
Since the US reply the tone has hardened on both sides. Iran threatened on 29 September: chief negotiator and parliament speaker Ghalibaf said that in a region where Iran cannot sell oil, nobody else will sell oil either, and that if Iran's security is not guaranteed, no infrastructure will remain safe; the Revolutionary Guards spokesman, Mohebbi, said: “Any vessel attempting to pass through sustains damage, either we strike it, or it hits a mine” (Times of Israel). The US side counters that it has the strait under control (Times of Israel, 26 September); the Revolutionary Guards explicitly called it “closed” on 29 September and disputed that account (Times of Israel). On 1 October Trump said: “We have to make that decision: We blow them up or make a deal” and “It's gonna end very soon, one way or the other”; whether bombing resumes after the election on 3 November he left open. The carrier group around USS Theodore Roosevelt left San Diego on 27 September and is due in the Arabian Sea between late October and late November, to join USS George H.W. Bush and USS George Washington (Gulf News). On 1 October a tanker in the Strait of Hormuz was also hit by an unknown projectile; it caught fire, the crew was unhurt and no one was named as responsible (UKMTO via Asharq Al-Awsat).
So the seven-day offer has failed, but the channel is open and the gap narrower than a week ago. The two sides read the situation in opposite ways: Washington sees Iran under pressure with no reason to be given concessions, Tehran sees the next move as Washington's. The record argues for caution either way. After the failed Islamabad talks the United States imposed its naval blockade in April, a memorandum did emerge in June, and on 8 July the ceasefire broke down again (Wikipedia, 2026 Strait of Hormuz campaign).
2. What actually flows through Hormuz today
As of 4 November: limited US strikes on Qeshm, a death off Oman, and October flows below September. Overnight into 3 November, US forces carried out what officials called limited, defensive strikes on air-defence positions on Qeshm Island after the Revolutionary Guards fired on a US aircraft; Iranian state media reported explosions on Qeshm, Hengam and near Bandar Abbas (AP via PBS, CBS News). They were the first US strikes since early September; a second US official told Reuters they did not signal a return to major combat. Another carrier is on its way, the Theodore Roosevelt with the cruiser Chosin and three destroyers according to Gulf News (4 November). At sea, UKMTO said on 30 October there had been 30 attacks on merchant ships in the region that month, a record (CBS News). The Qatari LNG carrier Al Mayeda was hit on 30 October (Nakilat, JMIC; reported by QNA on 31 October), a vessel was hit nine nautical miles off Lima on 1 November, and on 3 November the Indian-flagged MSV Al Jusufi was struck off Oman, killing one sailor, with 13 rescued by the Omani coast guard; that afternoon two projectiles hit the engine room of a tanker 14 nautical miles north-east of Lima, with no injuries (UKMTO via CBS News, Gulf News). On 4 November the IRGC claimed four tankers had struck mines in a “prohibited passage” south of the strait and were burning, and that two more vessels had been stopped; none of this is independently confirmed (CBS News). The monthly figures show the pullback: according to Vortexa, 17.1 million barrels a day of crude, condensate and products left the Gulf in October, down from 18.9 million in September, roughly three-quarters of pre-war levels; crude and condensate 14.0 million (86%), products 3.1 million, just over half of normal. Kpler counts 16.1 million barrels a day of crude and condensate through Hormuz, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Oman, down from 17.09 million in September; both firms expect upward revisions because shuttle tankers switch off their transponders (Reuters, 3 November). Tracking data cited by Gulf News show five commodity vessels in the strait on 31 October and none on 1 November, against more than 130 a day before the war.
As of 22 October: more hits, and new figures that contradict the old ones. At 18:30 UTC on 20 October an unknown projectile struck a tanker about 30 nautical miles southeast of the Iraqi port of Al Faw, causing no damage; at 01:45 UTC on 21 October a tanker was hit about 11 nautical miles west of Bukha in Oman and the resulting fire was put out. Both crews were safe, and UKMTO named neither the ships nor a perpetrator (gCaptain). By UKMTO's count there have been 32 attacks around the Arabian Peninsula so far in October, against 16 in all of September (Bloomberg via gCaptain). The IRGC Navy claims four ships were hit while transferring oil in the northern Gulf and three more struck mines west of the strait (Reuters); none of that is independently confirmed, and the JMIC found no evidence for the IRGC's mine report of 17 October (gCaptain).
The flow data now point in sharply different directions. Kpler puts crude and condensate leaving the Persian Gulf at 24.6 million barrels a day in the week to 18 October, a weekly high, and 16.7 million so far in October; Vortexa has 18 and 15.4 million, and both put the pre-war level at no less than 18.5 million (Bloomberg via gCaptain). A Kpler note of 16 October had put the previous week at about 8.5 million (Reuters). Satellite images show five supertankers loading at Saudi Arabia's largest Gulf terminal on 12 and 13 October and one on 20 October (Bloomberg via gCaptain). We do not net these series against each other: they come from different providers and measure different things over different periods.
As of 20 October: attacks are reaching further into the Gulf, and the traffic figures do not add up. The containership GFS Pride, hit in the strait on 13 October, sank the next day; all 21 crew were rescued unharmed. Iran claimed without evidence that it struck a mine (gCaptain), while CENTCOM says an IRGC projectile hit the ship and that the strait has been cleared of mines (Al Jazeera). In the week to 16 October the UK's UKMTO counted at least 12 attacks: one ship sank and two were disabled. On 16 October an unknown projectile struck the tanker ST3 about 68 nautical miles northeast of Al Jubail in Saudi Arabia, and on 18 October two projectiles hit a tug off Khor Fakkan in the UAE, slightly injuring one crew member; the JMIC then raised the Arabian Gulf to “substantial” (Update 106). The IRGC reported tankers hitting mines on routes it had not authorised on 17 and 18 October; none of those reports has been independently confirmed. Iran says the strait is unsafe for ships that do not coordinate with its strait authority (Al Jazeera).
How much still gets through depends on who is counting. UKMTO logged 125 outbound and 129 inbound transits in the seven days to 16 October, both weekly totals (Al Jazeera); before the war gCaptain put traffic at 130 to 140 transits a day, a daily figure counted differently and not directly comparable. Kpler put oil flows at 11.6 million barrels a day in the seven days to 13 October, about 68% of the pre-war baseline (Al Jazeera), yet a Kpler note issued on 16 October put Gulf crude at a seven-day average of about 8.5 million barrels a day for the previous week (Reuters). CENTCOM claims 400 ships and 100 million barrels in a week and says the strait is “controlled by the United States and our regional partners, not Iran”; Energy Secretary Chris Wright says Gulf crude flows are back to about 80% of pre-war levels, with refined products still constrained (Bloomberg). We do not net these numbers against each other: they come from different sources, cover different periods and partly measure different things. CENTCOM is a party to the conflict, and Tehran, which publishes no figures of its own, accuses Washington of exaggerating (Al Jazeera).
As of 11 October: the attacks continue, and the flow remains far below normal. On the evening of 10 October, at around 19:20 UTC, an outbound tanker in the Strait of Hormuz was struck on its port side by a projectile and caught fire; on 11 October a second outbound tanker was hit. Both crews were unharmed, and the UK's UKMTO named no perpetrator (gCaptain). The Revolutionary Guards navy said on 10 October that a crude supertanker on a route it had not approved had hit a mine with its navigation systems switched off; it gave neither a name nor a location, and there is no independent confirmation (Al Jazeera). Habibollah Sayyari, chief of staff and coordinator of Iran's army, said on state TV on 11 October: 'We have struck blows against enemy vessels. If anything else happens against Iran, we will strike them again.' He did not say which incidents he meant (Al Jazeera). Off Ras al-Khaimah in the UAE, masters were told by radio on 10 October to leave their anchorages; the sender is unknown (UKMTO via gCaptain).
According to US Central Command (CENTCOM), a fighter jet disabled the cargo ship Ocean Molica in the Gulf of Oman on 10 October by striking its stern; the ship had left an Iranian port and, CENTCOM says, tried to break the blockade of Iranian ports, and the crew was unharmed (gCaptain). Kpler data cited by CNBC show crude transits through the strait averaging 8.5 million barrels a day in the week to 7 October, about 40% below normal (Al Jazeera). That figure covers crude only; the shortfall in diesel and other products is described further down.
As of 9 October: the attacks now reach deep into the Gulf, but no closure of the whole Gulf has been declared. On the evening of 7 October Britain's UKMTO reported a tanker hit by several projectiles about 51 nautical miles north of Madinat ash Shamal in Qatar, with casualties among the crew (warning 158-26, via Middle East Eye); the security firm Vanguard says the vessel is the Acers, flagged in Antigua and Barbuda (Seatrade Maritime). According to Euronews it was the first attack in these waters in more than six months. On 8 October Vanguard reported a fire on a tanker about 40 kilometres off Fujairah in the Gulf of Oman, cause unclear (Euronews). At 10:00 UTC on 9 October a projectile struck a supertanker about 13 nautical miles west of Al Jazeera in the UAE and the fire has been put out; shipping and security sources identify it as the Gem No.2, flagged in Panama (Reuters). The UKMTO names no perpetrator in any of the cases. The same day the IRGC Navy said it had hit the LPG tanker NV Sunshine on an unauthorised route south of the strait, and announced that its action against such vessels was no longer limited to the Strait of Hormuz: they would be pursued across the whole region, and companies that had allowed themselves to be deceived by the US would be sanctioned with all their ships (Tasnim, Press TV). Whether the NV Sunshine was hit has not been confirmed independently; Seatrade Maritime notes that Iranian bodies have reported attacks before that proved false.
There is no declaration that the whole Persian Gulf is closed. The Revolutionary Guards claim control of the strait and say that routes used without their permission are not allowed (Tasnim); IRGC chief Ahmad Vahidi said in a message released on 8 October for the IRGC Navy Day that security in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz is a matter for the region and that no outside power has the right to interfere (Tasnim, 9 October). On 4 October the Joint Maritime Information Center rated the threat in the strait as “severe” and in the Arabian Gulf as “moderate”, with stable traffic there (JMIC, Update 102); that rating predates the attacks off Qatar and the UAE. Attacks inside the Gulf are not new in themselves: on 9 September a bunker tanker at anchor off the UAE and a supertanker off Iraq's Al-Faw were hit (Seatrade Maritime). US forces called Iran's claims of a closure false on 7 October and said merchant ships and energy shipments, including 20 million barrels of crude, were still passing, without giving a period (CENTCOM via IranWire); on 8 October Trump cited 22 million barrels in a single night, without a source (ABC News). Both sides are parties to the conflict. Independent figures lie in between: Kpler puts transits alone at 9.02 million barrels a day as a seven-day average to 3 October, about 47 per cent below the pre-war level by congress.net's own calculation; Kpler calls such fresh figures a provisional floor that is usually revised up substantially later (Kpler Insight via congress.net, 6 October), and crude exports from the region at roughly the pre-war level, because about 40 per cent of them bypass the strait (Kpler via Al Jazeera, 6 October). It is shipping that is getting dearer above all: the freight rate for a supertanker from the Gulf to China hit a record $1.3 million a day on 5 October, against an average of just under $60,000 a year earlier (Baltic Exchange via Bloomberg).
On the flow figures the strait is not shut, but it is a bottleneck, and for crude the flow has recovered: Kpler counted 13.5 million barrels a day of crude through Hormuz on 28 September, which IBTimes describes as the pre-war level; refined products, by contrast, managed only 677,000 barrels a day on a seven-day average, against 3.6 million before the war (Kpler via IBTimes UK, 1 October). The figures rest on different bases and must not be set against each other: 13.5 million is a daily reading for crude, while the September average was about 9.72 million barrels a day after a low of 2.2 million in July (Splash247 citing Kpler, 30 September). Goldman Sachs estimated at the end of September that about 23 million barrels a day leave the Middle East via Hormuz and alternative routes, close to pre-war levels (Bloomberg via Rigzone, 30 September); on 20 September CENTCOM put the strait at about 10 million, with Iran itself exporting zero barrels and the main lanes cleared of mines (Admiral Brad Cooper, Business Standard citing Bloomberg). Passage is not safe: on 29 September the British UKMTO reported two ships hit by projectiles, and on 1 October a tanker was struck by an unknown projectile, caught fire, the crew was unhurt and no one was named as responsible (UKMTO via Gulf News and Asharq Al-Awsat). Who controls the strait is disputed: the US side says it has it under control, while the Revolutionary Guards called it “closed” on 29 September and disputed that account (Times of Israel). The picture is not uniform: on 30 September Gulf News still described crude, products and gas as well below normal, with shipowners demanding high risk premiums. Before the war the strait handled about 125 large merchant ships a day (Israel Hayom) and roughly a fifth of global oil and LNG trade (EnergyNow). The gap is what the world market has been covering since March with stock draws, pipelines and higher US exports.
The bypass routes are themselves under fire. Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline, which together with the UAE bypass carried around 5 million barrels a day around Hormuz in the second quarter (Fortune/McKinsey, 17 September), was knocked out by drones in mid-September and has been running at about half capacity again since the end of September; tankers are being loaded at Yanbu once more (Reuters via The Nation, 29 September). According to Kpler, Saudi Arabia exported about 5.4 million barrels of crude a day in September after 2.45 million in August, with about 2.65 million going through Yanbu, heading towards 3 to 4 million; the Gulf states together reached 16.33 million barrels a day, the highest since the war began at the end of February, against 19.51 million in February (Splash247 citing Kpler, 30 September). Brent fell 2.6 per cent to $102.59 on 29 September. On 24 September Saudi air defences intercepted six Houthi ballistic missiles aimed at Taif province and the Yanbu area, the pipeline's Red Sea terminal, and Brent rose 3.4 per cent that day (Reuters via Investing.com). On 26 September drones targeted Riyadh and a missile flew towards Khamis Mushait; all were intercepted (Times of Israel). The EIA's outlook of 9 September assumes constraints lasting into the second quarter of 2027 (EIA STEO). Our glossary entry on the Strait of Hormuz explains why the waterway matters this much.
Show values as a table
| Date | Value |
|---|---|
| January 2, 2026 | $61.00 |
| January 9, 2026 | $63.34 |
| January 15, 2026 | $63.76 |
| January 30, 2026 | $70.69 |
| February 6, 2026 | $68.05 |
| February 12, 2026 | $67.52 |
| February 19, 2026 | $71.66 |
| February 27, 2026 | $72.48 |
| March 3, 2026 | $81.49 |
| March 6, 2026 | $92.69 |
| March 9, 2026 | $88.43 |
| March 18, 2026 | $101.99 |
| March 20, 2026 | $112.19 |
| March 27, 2026 | $112.57 |
| April 2, 2026 | $109.03 |
| April 8, 2026 | $94.75 |
| April 17, 2026 | $90.38 |
| April 23, 2026 | $105.07 |
| April 29, 2026 | $118.03 |
| May 4, 2026 | $114.40 |
| May 12, 2026 | $107.27 |
| May 19, 2026 | $111.28 |
| May 27, 2026 | $94.29 |
| June 5, 2026 | $93.09 |
| June 12, 2026 | $87.33 |
| June 19, 2026 | $80.57 |
| June 24, 2026 | $73.74 |
| July 10, 2026 | $76.80 |
| July 17, 2026 | $86.09 |
| July 23, 2026 | $100.69 |
| July 31, 2026 | $92.27 |
| August 7, 2026 | $86.04 |
| August 14, 2026 | $89.53 |
| August 21, 2026 | $95.29 |
| August 28, 2026 | $90.55 |
| September 4, 2026 | $96.90 |
| September 9, 2026 | $101.20 |
| September 11, 2026 | $104.61 |
| September 15, 2026 | $108.75 |
| September 16, 2026 | $105.83 |
| September 17, 2026 | $103.12 |
| September 18, 2026 | $103.87 |
| September 21, 2026 | $100.34 |
| September 22, 2026 | $99.25 |
| September 23, 2026 | $98.50 |
| September 24, 2026 | $106.60 |
| September 25, 2026 | $104.32 |
| September 28, 2026 | $105.28 |
| September 29, 2026 | $103.19 |
| September 30, 2026 | $96.38 |
| October 1, 2026 | $102.31 |
| October 2, 2026 | $100.03 |
| October 5, 2026 | $100.32 |
| October 6, 2026 | $100.58 |
| October 7, 2026 | $101.43 |
| October 8, 2026 | $104.28 |
| October 9, 2026 | $104.72 |
| October 12, 2026 | $106.65 |
| October 13, 2026 | $105.69 |
| October 14, 2026 | $106.06 |
| October 15, 2026 | $105.92 |
| October 16, 2026 | $109.86 |
| October 19, 2026 | $109.55 |
| October 20, 2026 | $108.79 |
| October 21, 2026 | $108.82 |
| October 22, 2026 | $113.17 |
| October 23, 2026 | $116.72 |
| October 26, 2026 | $115.81 |
| October 27, 2026 | $113.88 |
| October 28, 2026 | $115.32 |
| October 29, 2026 | $114.88 |
| October 30, 2026 | $113.43 |
| November 2, 2026 | $104.77 |
| November 3, 2026 | $103.60 |
| November 4, 2026 | $94.62 |
| November 5, 2026 | $98.29 |
| November 6, 2026 | $98.32 |
3. Three scenarios after the rejection
As of 4 November: still scenario 1, the stalemate, but the market is pricing scenario 2, a deal, more heavily than at any time since June. Brent fell about 7% on 2 November (CBS News: −7.4% to $105.03) after Trump wrote on Truth Social that a deal “could happen” and that Iran wants a settlement “as soon as possible” (CBS News). On 3 November Brent settled at $103.60 (−$1.17), its lowest since 7 October, and WTI at $96.09 (Reuters); on 4 November Brent traded at $104.36 in the morning (Reuters) and at $102.98 at 10:38 CET, WTI at $95.95 (HeizOel24). Brent is still up more than 70% this year (Bloomberg). Scenario 3, escalation, has arrived in a small dose: the US strikes on Qeshm are limited and defensive according to US officials, and Trump speaks of being “locked and loaded” but perhaps with no reason to go (Bloomberg via Irish Times). ING warns it is “probably too early to think escalation risks have passed”, while clear progress in talks would mean more downside (Reuters). Against the easing stand the inventory data: according to API, US crude stocks fell 5.27 million barrels in the week to 30 October and distillates 1.19 million (Reuters via TimesLIVE), and Haitong Futures calls diesel inventories still tight. For heating oil and diesel in Europe that means the risk premium in crude has shrunk, the product shortage has not.
As of 22 October: still scenario 1, the stalemate, with Saudi Arabia now driving much of the price action. On 21 October debris from an intercepted drone killed two people near the Shaybah oilfield and injured two more; the energy ministry named no perpetrator and said operations were unaffected (The National). That evening an attack on King Fahd airport in Dammam killed one person and injured eight, and no one has claimed it (Saudi aviation authority via Reuters). The State Department ordered non-emergency staff and families to leave Saudi Arabia, with a spokesman citing stepped-up attacks by the Iran-backed Houthis; Iran denies any role (CBS News).
Brent swung accordingly. On 20 October the December contract hit $111.99 but settled at $108.79; Reuters cites President Pezeshkian's meeting with Pakistan's army chief Munir as a counterweight to the continuing attacks. On 21 October it settled almost unchanged at $108.82: hopes of Ukraine talks weighed, while a bigger-than-expected US crude draw and the tanker attacks lent support (Reuters). By 06:26 GMT on 22 October Brent was up 2.59% at $111.64; Reuters points to the deaths at Shaybah and Dammam, the withdrawal of family members from US missions and the IRGC's claims, among other factors. We do not forecast where prices go from here.
As of 20 October: still scenario 1, the stalemate, but prices are now under pressure from two fronts. In the Gulf the attacks are spreading while Iran keeps claiming control of the strait. Saudi Arabia is the second front: on 16 October the Saudi-led coalition said it had intercepted a ballistic missile aimed at Yanbu, the Red Sea port the kingdom relies on to bypass Hormuz (Reuters). On 19 October the Houthis claimed strikes on an Aramco site in Yanbu, the Shaybah oilfield and the airports of Riyadh and Abha; Saudi authorities did not initially confirm them and Reuters could not verify them (Reuters, 20 October). Riyadh's airport has only reopened on restricted terms since 18 October, with every flight needing approval from the aviation authority GACA (Aerospace Global News).
The market has priced this in. Brent rose 3.7% to settle at $109.86 on 16 October, its highest close since 19 May; Reuters cites the missile aimed at Yanbu, more attacks around Hormuz, unverified Israeli reports flagged by Energy Aspects that Iran might be preparing a pre-emptive strike, and a Ukrainian strike after which Russia's Ryazan refinery suspended a primary crude unit. On 19 October Brent slipped just 0.3% to $109.55 on profit-taking, and on the morning of 20 October it reached $111.05; Reuters points to the Houthi claims and a Kpler count of at least 18 ships attacked in two weeks, while ING speaks of a “significant risk premium”. There are counterweights too: Washington reports higher crude flows out of the Gulf. We do not forecast where prices go from here.
As of 11 October: scenario 1, the stalemate, still holds, but two forces now pull in opposite directions. One is escalation: more tankers hit in the strait, Tehran's rejection of the US reply (Reuters) and the attack on Riyadh airport, claimed by the Houthis, that killed at least 12 people (GACA via Al Jazeera) and opens a second front against Saudi Arabia. The other is relief on diesel: the US futures contract for diesel and heating oil fell 4.6% on 9 October after Trump announced Russian deliveries and amid reports that China will resume fuel exports (DTN); Russia eased its export ban on 10 October (TASS). Brent nonetheless held above $104 and settled at $104.72 on Friday (Reuters). For heating oil and diesel, that makes the picture slightly less tense than for crude.
As of 9 October: scenario 1, the stalemate, still holds, but at sea it is turning more violent. Politically, Trump has ruled out new attacks before 3 November (ABC News); the part of scenario 3 that involves air strikes therefore falls after the election at the earliest. At sea, though, the escalation is already here: the attacks reach as far as Qatar and the UAE, and the Revolutionary Guards announce that they will pursue ships on unauthorised routes across the whole region (Tasnim). The market has priced in both: Brent rose 4.1 per cent to $104.28 on 8 October, partly because of Hurricane Isaias, which shut in 62.9 per cent of oil output in the US Gulf of Mexico according to the US Marine Minerals Administration; it came off its intraday high on Thursday after Trump had published his pledge (Bloomberg via Rigzone, gCaptain). On Friday morning Brent stood at $102.81 (HeizOel24.ch). For scenario 2, a deal, there is still no agreed order of steps, and both sides are arguing over it (Al Jazeera, 7 October).
Scenario 1, stalemate: the rejection stands, the mediators keep working, and the strait stays a bottleneck that the US side calls controlled and the Revolutionary Guards called “closed” on 29 September (Times of Israel). That is where things stand on 2 October, now with a US reply on the table. The week after the rejection showed what this scenario looks like: Brent jumped more than four dollars in early trade on 28 September and settled only about one per cent higher at $105.28 as Qatar announced separate talks (investingLive); on the 29th it fell 2.6 per cent to $102.59 as Saudi Arabia resumed exports via Yanbu (Reuters via The Nation); on the 30th the expiring November contract settled at $103.53 and the December contract at $98.03 (Bloomberg via Rigzone); on 1 October the December contract jumped 4.37 per cent to $102.31 after Chinese refiners suspended product exports other than to Hong Kong and Macau until further notice, according to four people familiar with the matter and without official confirmation from China (Reuters via Dawn); at 13:14 on 2 October it stood at $100.03 (HeizOel24.ch), and in the afternoon it briefly fell below $99 (Trading Economics), after the G7 decided to release 100 million barrels through the IEA, starting immediately and spread over four months, with a “substantial” share of diesel in the first 20 days (The Irish Times, 16:25). Supply pushes down, diplomacy holds the premium, and news such as the Chinese export halt or the G7 decision on reserves moves the price by several dollars within a day; Brent stays well above the summer but far below the monthly high near $110. For heating oil this means a high price with no clear direction: German heating oil at €164.57 per 100 litres at 12:24 on 2 October (HeizOel24), French ordinaire at €1,849 per 1,000 litres on 1 October (prixfioul.fr).
Scenario 2, a deal after all: crude reacts first and hardest. When reports of an agreement circulated on 12 June, Brent fell 3.37 per cent in one session to $87.33 (Yahoo Finance); Goldman Sachs put the value of a normalisation one month earlier at roughly $10 a barrel for late 2026 (Yahoo Finance, 21 June). Diesel and heating oil would follow more slowly, because US distillate stocks are at their lowest September level since 1982 (EnergyNow) and Russia's diesel export ban runs to the end of October (Hydrocarbon Processing). Gas would move with oil, because a reopening would bring Qatari LNG back.
Scenario 3, escalation: attacks on ships, pipelines or ports, or a return to air strikes. The market knows the pattern from the summer: after the ceasefire broke on 8 July, Brent climbed from $71.57 on 1 July to $96.78 on 24 July, and the year's high was $118.35 on 31 March (Wikipedia). This time diesel rather than crude would lead, because stocks are empty and on 26 September Ukrainian drones halted the Ilsky refinery in Russia's Krasnodar region, which produces nearly 6.6 million tonnes of fuel a year (Kyiv Independent). The political risk is now spelled out: Trump left open on 1 October whether to resume attacks after the election on 3 November, and a third aircraft carrier, USS Theodore Roosevelt, is due in the Arabian Sea between late October and late November (Gulf News); Iran threatened on 29 September to attack infrastructure and ships (Times of Israel), and on 1 October a tanker was hit (UKMTO via Asharq Al-Awsat). Which scenario plays out will be settled between Washington, Tehran and the mediators, not on the exchange; our Oil price today page keeps the daily reading.
4. What to do now, and what not to do
Do not trade on headlines, but take note that the picture has turned: the one piece of news that could make heating oil cheaper in the short run, a Hormuz deal, has not been off the table since Trump's no of 26 September, but it has no date: the US reply of 30 September settles the steps, not their order (Gulf News). If your tank is below a third, order; heating oil follows crude with a lag of days, and dealers pass on falls more slowly than rises (see pass-through effect). Above two thirds you can wait, but you are no longer waiting for a deadline, only for talks without a date. For orientation: heating oil cost on average €164.57 per 100 litres in Germany at 12:24 on 2 October for a 3,000-litre order (HeizOel24) and €1,849 per 1,000 litres ordinaire in France on 1 October (prixfioul.fr). The full rule with every threshold is on Heating oil: buy now or wait?, and the Northeast outlook on Northeast heating oil forecast.
For diesel users relief comes more slowly whatever happens, for the reasons set out on our page about the diesel shortage of winter 2026/27. For gas customers in Europe the question is whether things calm down before winter: German storage stood at 57.7 per cent in the latest reading (Federal Network Agency, via ZDFheute of 30 September), and minister Reiche has ordered Sefe to buy and store eight terawatt hours of gas by 15 December because of continuing geopolitical risks (ZDFheute); details on gas storage and winter 2026/27. The broader status of the crisis is on our Hormuz crisis hub.
See in a minute what Brent at 90, 100 or 120 dollars means for your household.
Calculate my numbers